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What are the Dimensions
of the Conscious Field?
Abstract: I analyse the meaning of a popular idiom among conscious-
ness researchers, in which an individual’s consciousness is described
as a ‘field’. I consider some of the contexts where this idea appears, in
particular discussions of attention and the unity of consciousness. In
neither case, I argue, do authors provide the resources to cash out all
the implications of field-talk: in particular, they do not give sense to
the idea of conscious elements being arrayed along multiple dimen-
sions. I suggest ways to extend and generalize the attentional cons-
trual of ‘field-talk’ to provide a genuine multiplicity of dimensions,
through the notions of attentional proximity and causal proximity: the
degree to which two experiential elements are disposed to bring one
another into attention when attended, or to interact in other distinc-
tively mental ways. I conclude that if consciousness is a field, it is one
organized by attentional and/or causal proximity.
Consciousness displays phenomenological structure. But what kind
of structure? In this paper I want to explore an idea which has often
been suggested but rarely developed in detail, namely that conscious-
ness is structured as a field. A number of prominent authors writing
about consciousness have used the language of fields, often in promi-
nent or emphatic positions. Moreover, there is a certain intuitive
attractiveness to the idea: consciousness does seem to comprise ele-
ments somehow arrayed, some closer to each other, some further
away, some at the centre, others further out. But, I will argue, the anal-
yses usually presented with such talk do not actually yield the kind of
structure which the idea of a conscious field suggests.
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I take it that, to be a field, consciousness must have its diverse
elements1 laid out along two or more ‘dimensions’, i.e. standing in
relations of degree, in at least two more-or-less orthogonal ways. By
this definition, clear cases of fields include the visual field, a physical
field of force, any graph, and space itself. Time is not a field, since it
has only one dimension, though relativistic space-time is. Moreover, I
take it we can appropriately call consciousness a field only if it ‘pres-
ents itself’ to us as structured by these relations, both in that we have
ready introspective access to the relations themselves, and in that they
exercise a decisive influence on the phenomenological judgments we
are inclined to make about consciousness. Obviously the elements of
consciousness bear relations of degree to each other, but it is a further
claim that they are experienced as organized by these relations.
An analysis of the structure of consciousness may, moreover, open
up ways to analyse the subject of experience, since the two are clearly
connected. In particular, an analogy of the form subject:conscious-
ness::eye:visual field is discussed by Wittgenstein (1921/1961,
5.633), and a similar analogy replacing ‘eye’ with ‘vanishing point’ is
discussed by Sorensen (2007). But in both cases the exact meaning of
the analogy remains obscure until we have some idea of how the struc-
ture of consciousness in general compares to that of the visual field.
It may be that consciousness is not a field, or can be called a field
only in a misleading or confused way (I consider a proposal of this
sort in Section 3). But if talk of a field does capture something about
the structure of consciousness, what? What are the dimensions of this
field? Where are its centre and/or boundaries? These are the questions
I will pursue.
In Section 1 I review some uses of ‘field-talk’ to convey the unity of
consciousness, noting that this generally provides no dimensions for
elements to be arrayed in. In Section 2 I consider and reject the defla-
tionary proposal that our tendency to use ‘field’ talk about conscious-
ness arises simply from the fact that consciousness represents a spatial
field. In Section 3 I review discussions of the attentional structure of
the field, noting that they provide only one dimension. In Sections 4
and 5 I propose more multi-dimensional analyses, and finally in
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[1] One of the points of contention in this area concerns whether these elements should be
called ‘experiences’, ‘parts of experiences’, or something else (see Tye, 2003, pp. 21–41;
Raymont and Brook, 2009; Dainton, 2010; Bayne, 2010, pp. 20–46; and Chudnoff, 2013,
for discussion of this question). I am neutral here, but will sometimes refer to them as ‘ex-
periences’ for convenience — if this is considered misleading, the term ‘experience’ can
be replaced with the more colourless term ‘element’.
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Section 6 I argue that consciousness is a deforming field, unlike the
visual field.
1. The Conscious Field as Unified Consciousness
Many authors say that consciousness is a field, meaning that it is uni-
fied in some way. In Bayne and Chalmers (2003) the term ‘field’ is
introduced as a way of referring to a total conscious state, i.e. a con-
scious state subsuming all of a subject’s conscious states: ‘a subject’s
total conscious state might be thought of as the subject’s conscious
field’ (ibid., p. 5). This is followed by the use of the terms ‘sub-
sumptive unity’ and ‘field unity’ as interchangeable (ibid., e.g. pp. 8,
10, 12). Talking of a phenomenal field or conscious field is taken as
equivalent to talking of unified consciousness.
This is reinforced in Bayne’s (2010) book, The Unity of Conscious-
ness, the first chapter of which is entitled ‘The Phenomenal Field’.
Here he repeats that ‘what it is for a pair of experiences to occur within
a single phenomenal field just is for them to enjoy a conjoint
phenomenality’ (noting that ‘this claim is stipulative… not… a sub-
stantive thesis’) (ibid., p. 11). Later he says that ‘the field metaphor…
accurately captures the structure of consciousness at a time’ (ibid.).
Searle (2000) also sometimes uses the term ‘field’ to mean simply
‘unified consciousness’, but at other times seems to associate the term
‘field’ with the stronger claim that consciousness is holistic. For
instance, to convey the idea that consciousness is distinctively uni-
fied, he says ‘I do not just [have a list of particular experiences].
Rather I experience all of these as part of a single unified conscious
field’ (ibid., p. 561–2). But he also distinguishes what he sees as two
opposed models of consciousness:
[T]he building block model, according to which any conscious field is
made of its various parts, and the unified field model, according to
which we should try to explain the unified character of subjective states
of consciousness. (Ibid., p. 557, emphasis added)2
In a similar vein, Uriah Kriegel unpacks the claim that ‘my overall
phenomenology is unified at the time’ as meaning that ‘it does not feel
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[2] This distinction is confusing, for two reasons. Firstly, if ‘conscious field’ simply means
‘unified consciousness’, then ‘unified field’ is redundant, meaning ‘unified unified con-
sciousness’. Secondly, it seems that adherents of the ‘building block model’ can perfectly
well agree that consciousness is unified, and hence that it is a field (indeed, a unified field).
This is reinforced by Searle’s (2000) own use of the term ‘field’ in characterizing this posi-
tion, e.g. p. 572: ‘The building block theory: The conscious field is made up of small com-
ponents that combine to form the field.’
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like just so many unconnected items, but rather like a single cohesive
“field of experience”’ (Kriegel, 2009, p. 172).
So there is a pattern of people using this language to convey some-
thing about the unified character of consciousness. But in so far as
unified consciousness is analysed in terms of every bit of conscious-
ness being related in some intimate way to every other bit, or to the
whole, it does not provide any dimensions. If two experiences are uni-
fied, that in itself gives no meaning to the idea that they are close to or
far from each other, in any particular direction, within any particular
region of the field. To this extent it is more like a set of elements
defined by bearing a certain relation to one another, rather than a field.
I think that we should retain the idea of a conscious field being
equivalent to unified consciousness; it is intuitively attractive to think
of consciousness being phenomenologically structured as an ‘array’
or ‘space’, and this helps to capture the idea that all elements of con-
sciousness are connected. But the ‘field’ idea inherently implies a fur-
ther structure, which talk of unity does not capture.
2. The Conscious Field as External Space:
A Deflationary Proposal
There is a way to deflate the idea of a conscious field, namely by inter-
preting it simply as the claim that consciousness represents the
three-dimensional spatial field in which we live. There would then be
no distinctive question about the structure of the conscious field,
beyond the different ways that consciousness represents space.
This idea appears in the literature on the unity of consciousness as
the claim that ‘consciousness is unified’ means simply that conscious-
ness represents a single unified space. Dainton calls this deflationary
analysis the S-thesis: ‘that simultaneous experiences are co-conscious
by virtue of occurring within a single unified phenomenal space’
(Dainton, 2004, p. 9), where a ‘phenomenal space’ is a set of experi-
ences isomorphically representing objects in objective space. The
S-thesis, as I will follow Dainton in calling it, has been considered by
a number of philosophers, and consistently rejected, for broadly simi-
lar reasons. In particular, I believe we should reject the S-thesis about
phenomenal unity because not all experiences have spatial content,
and because spatial disunity is compatible with phenomenal unity.
The failure of the S-thesis, along with the fact that attentional relations
can cross-cut represented spatial ones, should lead us to reject the
deflationary proposal about the field-structure of consciousness.
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Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
16
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
The first objection is that not all of our experiences have spatial
content, and yet all of our experiences seem to be unified. This objec-
tion is given in very similar terms by Dainton (ibid., p. 9), and by
Bayne and Chalmers (2003, p. 4). Various examples are given of expe-
riences without spatial content (the first two from Dainton, the last
two from Bayne and Chalmers):
 conscious thoughts which do not involve spatial imagery of any
kind;
 certain types of sounds;
 an emotional experience such as melancholy;
 a conscious thought about philosophy.
One response to this objection would be to say that these other,
non-spatial, experiences are not strictly phenomenally conscious, or
that in so far as they are conscious it is by having associated sensory
components. Tye takes something like this line, in that he regards ‘the
phenomenology of conscious thoughts [as] derive[d] fundamen-
tally… from the phenomenology of their associated linguistic, audi-
tory images’ (Tye, 2003, p. 79), but I follow Bayne and Chalmers in in
finding this implausible (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003, p. 7). There is
something it is like to think, just as there is ‘something that it is like to
get a joke, to be puzzled about a problem, and to see that an argument
is fallacious’ (ibid., p. 6).3
A second objection to the S-thesis is that we can imagine hypotheti-
cal cases in which a subject has spatially disunified, but phenomenally
unified, experiences (Bayne argues that there may also be actual
examples of this in ‘heautoscopic hallucinations’, 2010, pp. 261–2).
Dainton, Bayne, and Tye all establish this through thought experi-
ments involving a single brain receiving two disconnected streams of
perceptual and/or bodily sensations.
Bayne’s example is ‘Borgy’, three bodies whose brains are con-
nected by radio transmitters so as to function as smoothly together as
the hemispheres of a normal brain (ibid., pp. 262–6). Dainton’s exam-
ple involves two bodies, each without a brain but with radio receivers
that pick up signals sent by a single brain, held in a secure location
elsewhere (2004, pp. 9–10). Tye’s example, designed to show the sep-
arability of bodily and perceptual spaces, involves a person buried in
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[3] An alternative response might be that thoughts, etc. in fact have spatial content of a degen-
erate sort. One might say, for instance, that thoughts are experienced as occurring ‘in the
head’, behind the eyes and between the ears, and are thus spatially unified with other expe-
riences. I have not seen this approach developed in sufficient detail, and am unsure of how
compelling it could be.
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sand but with their eyes and ears attached to long nervous stalks pro-
jecting above the sand and exposed to a 3D film of a rollercoaster ride
(2003, pp.76–8).
The S-thesis implies that in these cases, because the subject lacks
spatial unity, they will also lack phenomenal unity — under the pres-
sure of these disorganized inputs, their consciousness will ‘split’ to
cope with the different streams. All three authors consider and ulti-
mately reject this idea; there is little reason to think this would happen.
We often manage to process apparently conflicting sensory inputs,
such as when subject to illusions, or wearing vision-inverting goggles
(this point is made in Tye, 2003, p. 78, and Bayne, 2010, p. 264).
If the S-thesis is false, then phenomenal unity is both irreducible to
spatial unity and central to the idea of a conscious field: this suggests
that the idea of a conscious field goes beyond the representation of
spatiality. Here is further support for that conclusion: attentional rela-
tions are important to conscious structure, but need not coincide with
represented spatial relations. For instance, two objects might be right
beside each other in the visual field, but one be the focus of attention
and the other completely peripheral and unattended. Conversely, two
objects perceived as being far apart might be ‘close together’ in
attentional terms, if we were consciously focused on comparing them,
or discerning differences between them.
I conclude that we should not accept the deflationary proposal. If
consciousness is a field, we will not understand the structure of this
field by investigating the content of conscious representations, but by
investigating the structure in which those representations themselves
are arrayed.
3. The Conscious Field as
Attentional-Focus-and-Periphery
We have looked at how the idea of a conscious field relates to the unity
of consciousness, and to the representational content of conscious-
ness. A third approach to the conscious field aims to characterize it in
relation to attention. Here consciousness is described as a field with a
centre and a margin: what is attended is at the centre, while what is
unattended is at the margin. Kriegel, Searle, and Bayne all sometimes
speak in this way,4 and William James provides an earlier example:
In most of our fields of consciousness there is a core of sensation that is
very pronounced… [While] thinking and feeling, [you] are getting
DIMENSIONS OF THE CONSCIOUS FIELD 93
[4] For instance, Bayne describes the phenomenal field as ‘a small band of focal experience
surrounded by an experiential penumbra’(2010, p. 79), and Kriegel observes that ‘Usu-
ally, the phenomenological field has a center/periphery structure’ (2009, p. 173).
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through your eyes sensations of my face and figure… The sensations
are the centre or focus, the thought and feelings the margin, of your
actually present conscious field. (James, 1899/1983, p. 18)
It is unclear, however, whether this language of centres and peripher-
ies is more than a convenient image for expressing the observation
that we attend to some things and not to others. Sebastian Watzl claims
that it is more than an image, and that ‘The structure of attentional
space can be treated with some of the same formal precision, with
which we can, say, treat the structure of space-time’5 (Watzl, 2011, pp.
159–60). His ‘structuralist’ account of attention holds that:
Consciously attending to something consists in the conscious mental
process of structuring one’s stream of consciousness so that some parts
of it are more central than others. (Ibid., p. 145)
Watzl describes this ‘structuring’ as the production of an ‘attentional
space’, constituted by ‘attentional relations’ between experiences
(ibid., pp. 158–60). The simplest of these relations, and the only one
Watzl discusses in any detail, is ‘peripherality’, where something is at
the centre of consciousness (i.e. attended to) iff all other experiences
are ‘peripheral to’ it. Experiences outside the centre can also be
peripheral to each other, when one is ‘more peripheral than’ the other,
i.e. further from the centre of attention (ibid., p. 160). The peri-
pherality relation is taken as primitive, irreflexive, antisymmetric, and
transitive (ibid., p. 160).
I think Watzl’s account is a step in the right direction, but it stops
short of giving us an adequate account of how consciousness might be
a field. This is because it is ‘centrocentric’, overly focused on the
focus; the only component of attentional structure that is explained is
the peripherality relation, and this only provides a single dimension:
closeness to focal attention. If this were the only dimension to speak
of, there would be no reason to plot attention as a centre, since it could
just be taken as one extremity of a line, with ‘fringe’ contents at the
other.
Intuitively, though, we can make sense of two equally peripheral
experiences being ‘close to’ each other, and another two being ‘far
apart’. Consciousness is experienced as an organized whole, in which
some elements are more closely connected than others. For instance, I
might be focusing my attention on my computer screen, with a number
of contents somewhat peripheral to this: plans for what to write in the
94 L. ROELOFS
[5] Watzl does not speak of consciousness as a ‘field’, but does speak of it as involving a sort
of ‘space’. I take it that anything which could be called a ‘space’ could just as well be
called a ‘field’.
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
16
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
next section, memories of the previous page, awareness of my legs,
awareness of my feet, etc. Some of these might be peripheral to others,
but they need not be — they might all be perfectly equally-situated in
respect of peripherality. But my awareness of my legs and of my feet
are clearly closely connected, as are my intentions and memories
related to this paper. Both form ‘clusters’ whose members are more
related to each other than to members of other clusters.
Attentional structure does seem to be the right thing to investigate,
but we should seek an account that can capture ‘peripheral connec-
tions’ between unattended experiences, and thereby capture the idea
that consciousness is a field, i.e. something with more than one
dimension.
4. The Conscious Field as a
Terrain of Attentional Proximity
In light of Section 3’s discussion we should look for an attentional
relation which can hold between two experiences independently of
their relation to the present focus of attention, and which is a matter of
degree. My proposed candidate is ‘attentional proximity’, the propen-
sity of experiences to transfer attention to each other. For instance,
recall the example in which I have four peripherally conscious
experiences:
(a) bodily awareness of my legs;
(b) bodily awareness of my feet;
(c) intentions about the next section;
(d) memories of the last page.
We wanted a way to capture the idea that (a) and (b) are ‘close
together’ in the conscious field, as are (c) and (d), though the two pairs
may be very ‘far apart’. I think we can capture this by observing that if
I attend to (a), (b) will be more likely to enter attention, and vice versa.
If I have been ignoring a mild pain in my foot, I am more likely to
notice it if my attention is drawn to my leg. The same can be said of the
different experiences related to this paper.6
On this analysis, the conscious field is a sort of attentional terrain,
through which attention moves. It moves quickly and easily over short
‘distances’, and with more difficulty over long ones. We are intu-
itively inclined to speak of consciousness as a ‘field’ because we
DIMENSIONS OF THE CONSCIOUS FIELD 95
[6] We might talk either of ‘me easily moving my attention’ or of ‘attention easily/frequently
moving’, depending on whether we wished to think of attention as something the subject
actively does, or as an event in a deterministic causal chain.
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recognize it as something that ‘we’ can move (our attention) around
in.
It is likely that attentional proximity strongly correlates with many
representational relations. For instance, things represented as spa-
tially close to each other tend, other things being equal, to be atten-
tionally close to each other; the same goes for things which have a
common ‘theme’ (as the above example illustrates). But neither sort of
representational unity can completely explain attentional proximity:
we may for instance have a strong association between two objec-
tively unrelated ideas, while certain objective connections never
occur to us. This is one reason why we should reject attempts to
reduce attentional structure to the structure of a represented field.
This proposal lets us make sense of consciousness being a field
with distances between its elements. But what about the directions in
which there are these distances? These can be constructed from the
ratios between distances. For instance, given that distance A – B = X,
and distance B – C = Y, we can determine the dimensions of the space
containing A, B, and C by looking at the distance A – C. If it is X + Y,
we can arrange them on a single line, in the order A – B – C; if it is
X – Y, or Y – X, we can again arrange them on a single line, with A and
C on the same side of B. If it is some other value, we can arrange them
in a triangle, thereby establishing two dimensions. Further points
D,E,F… will either be fitted into this plane based on their relative dis-
tances from A, B, and C, or will have a set of distances requiring fur-
ther dimensions. For instance, four equidistant points would need to
be represented as the corners of a tetrahedron, while five equidistant
points would imply more than three dimensions. Dimensions, that is,
can be defined implicitly by the structure of distances.
If we analysed the structure of consciousness in terms of a field of
attentional proximity, we would obviously need an independent
account of attention. Somewhat awkwardly, the account of attention
most congenial to this analysis — Watzl’s structuralist account —
defines it in terms of the structure of consciousness. But explaining
structure by attention, and attention by structure, is circular. This is
not a huge problem for this analysis of the conscious field, since there
are many other accounts of attention available, but if we can
generalize this analysis to remove its dependence specifically on the
notion of attention, that would be worth exploring; the next section
suggests one approach to doing so.
96 L. ROELOFS
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5. The Conscious Field as a
Terrain of Causal Proximity
We can broaden the notion of ‘attentional proximity’ to include other
forms of interaction as well as transfers of attention. More precisely,
we might speak of ‘direct’ causal relations among conscious experi-
ences, as opposed to relations with conscious experiences which
depend on the holding of other causal relations.7 We could also speak
of ‘sensitive’ causal relations, those which occur in virtue of the fine-
grained experiential and representational properties of their relata. We
could then say that consciousness is a field in which different experi-
ences are laid out according to their ‘causal proximity’, their tendency
to affect each other in direct, sensitive ways, which includes but is not
limited to transferring attention.
The form that these causal relations take will somewhat depend on
the sorts of experiences involved. Two conscious thoughts might
interact by informing and revising each other’s content. Two con-
scious intentions might interact by mutual adjustment. In general,
when two conscious experiences interact, it will commonly involve
the production of a new experience whose content and properties
reflect both. A perception of red and a perception of blue might inter-
act by producing a perception of contrast, for example. This third
experience might then have distinctive properties — e.g. two flavours
might blend together into one more pleasant than either.8 A different
sort of interaction, which might be seen as the failed version of the
above sort, is the generation of dissonance or tension. Two firmly-
held but contradictory beliefs, for instance, will often interact not by
producing a consistent joint belief but by producing a (vague or
precise) awareness that there is a problem.
However, it is not necessary to specify exactly what sorts of interac-
tion are in question, since all the above forms of interaction tend to go
together — the conditions under which two experiences will produce
a sense of dissonance are roughly the same as those under which they
would produce a conjunctive belief, or produce a third belief which is
DIMENSIONS OF THE CONSCIOUS FIELD 97
[7] For instance, if I hear someone’s voice, which leads me to reflect on my life so far, which
leads me to become sad, we would not count that auditory perception as direct cause of the
sadness. This distinction is meant to be rough and intuitive.
[8] ‘Gestalt unity’, as briefly discussed by Tye (2003, p. 13) and Bayne and Chalmers (2003,
p. 6), is a special case of this, distinguished by the third experience having very prominent
novel features due to very specific, but less prominent, features of the first two. While the
mentioned authors all say that Gestalt unity is quite rare, I agree, but also think that the pro-
duction of simpler sorts of novelty (e.g. two colours producing an experience of contrast)
is ubiquitous.
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a consequence of their conjunction, or transfer attention from one to
the other. We can fudge this question by speaking of causal proximity
in general.9
This analysis of the dimensions of consciousness connects neatly
with at least one account of the unity of consciousness, which we
observed ‘field-talk’ was often employed to capture. Shoemaker
argues that the mechanisms which make a state conscious are also the
mechanisms which make two states co-conscious, namely ‘be[ing], at
least to some degree, integrated into a larger set of mental states...
[with] aptness to generate perceptual and introspective beliefs…
availability for use as premises in reasoning… [and] availability for
the rational control of behaviour’ (Shoemaker, 2003, p. 63). I take it
that the sort of interactions indicated here are the same sort of interac-
tions I appealed to in defining causal proximity, and so the causal
proximity account suggests that to be part of a unified consciousness
(to be in the field at all) an experience must be at some distance from
other items in the field, meaning that it must be ‘at least to some
degree’disposed to interact in the relevant ways. The causal proximity
account does not entail a functionalistic account of unity, but it dove-
tails nicely with such an account if the latter is found independently
attractive.
It is worth noting that some of the forms of interaction that consti-
tute causal proximity might obtain between conscious experiences
and unconscious states.10 For example, the standing unconscious
belief that tigers are dangerous might interact directly and sensitively
with the conscious perception of a tiger, making it salient and produc-
ing a sense of fear (at least, that is one way to describe the complex
way that knowledge and perception interact).
One might take from this the idea that unconscious beliefs and other
states can somehow occupy positions in the conscious field, deter-
98 L. ROELOFS
[9] In a fully worked out version of this account, we might commit to a definite list of relevant
forms of interaction, as well as a weighting scheme for how they relate to distances in the
conscious field. Alternatively, we might refrain from picking any one such scheme, as
long as we were willing to accept that the structure of the resultant field is consequently
vague. Similar remarks apply to different ways of characterizing a ‘propensity’ to interact
— under different conditions, different causal interactions become more or less likely.
Presumably we wish to say ‘under normal conditions’, and it is clearly a vague matter
which conditions are normal.
This might be analysed as a form of ontic vagueness, in the structure of consciousness
itself, or as a form of representational vagueness in our introspective impression of con-
sciousness (leaning heavily on the idea that the field is the structure in which conscious-
ness ‘presents itself’ to the subject, becoming thereby an object of awareness). Both of
these options will be controversial, especially the postulate of ontic vagueness: if we
wished to avoid both that might be a reason to prefer the attentional proximity account.
[10] I thank Ole Koksvik for pressing me on this point.
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mined by their causal proximity to other states. That is, one might
think that our impression of consciousness as a field is more like a
conscious impression of the mind as a whole, with both conscious
experiences and unconscious ‘background states’ together forming a
single interconnected whole.11
Alternatively, one might think that the conscious field necessarily
includes nothing but conscious experiences. In particular, one might
feel that while conscious unity does not give structure to the field, it is
still a necessary condition for being in the field at all, and unconscious
items plausibly cannot be phenomenally unified with anything. Simi-
larly, one might think that while attentional proximity is only one ele-
ment of causal proximity, it is a crucial element in that being at some
attentional distance from something is a necessary condition for being
at any causal proximity from something. Since it is plausible that an
unconscious item cannot be at any attentional distance from anything
because it is not a potential target of attention, this would entail that
unconscious items cannot be in the conscious field.
I wish to remain neutral on whether to make attentional proximity
or phenomenal consciousness necessary ingredients in causal proxim-
ity, and thereby also remain neutral on whether unconscious items
might occupy positions in the conscious field. Depending on how we
want to think about the relation of consciousness to the unconscious,
we might be intrigued by the idea that items within the conscious field
might not themselves be conscious. But we might also rule this out on
either of two principled grounds: that only conscious experiences can
be phenomenally unified, or that only conscious experiences are
potential targets of attention.
Causal proximity not only lets us analyse consciousness as a field
without presupposing any view of attention, it also suggests (without
demanding) a (partial) analysis of attention in terms of this structure.
What is attended is at the centre of the conscious field, and the centre
of a field is, overall, the point closest to many other points at once,
whereas the periphery is on average more distant from other points.
That is, the causal proximity analysis suggests that an experience is
the focus of attention when it is made, on average, more causally
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[11] An even more radical move would be to construe the unconscious/conscious distinction as
itself a matter of degree, possibly correlating with ‘degree of attention’ as a development
of the idea that attention is necessary and sufficient for consciousness (cf. Prinz, 2011), so
that the unconscious is simply that which is furthest from the attentional focus, out in the
far periphery of the conscious field. James seems to suggest something of this sort when he
writes that ‘my present field of consciousness is a centre surrounded by a fringe that
shades insensibly into a subconscious more’ (1909/1977, p. 103, emphasis added).
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proximate to the rest of the field’s contents — more able to influence
them and be influenced by them.
Attending to, for instance, a belief will greatly increase the likeli-
hood that any conflicting beliefs or perceptions we have will come to
mind and be used to revise it; attending to a percept brings to mind all
of the things we could compare with it, conclude from it, or do with it.
As Nagel says of the unity of consciousness, ‘for elements of experi-
ence or other mental events occurring simultaneously or in close tem-
poral proximity, the mind which is their subject can also experience
the simpler relations between them if it attends to the matter’ (Nagel,
1971, p. 407, emphasis added).
This analysis of attention is only partial; for one thing, it leaves out
all reference to the inputs and outputs to the mind (this is how Watzl,
2011, pp. 18–21, differentiates a ‘structuralist’ analysis of attention
from a ‘selection’ analysis). Those might be essential to attention, or
they might not. In practice, it seems likely that the ‘consuming sys-
tems’ of the mind, such as those involved in memory-formation, ver-
bal report, and motor control, will draw primarily from what is at the
centre of attention: what is attended is privileged both by the internal
structure of consciousness and by the channels leading out from
consciousness.
By contrast to the attentional centre, experiences which are unat-
tended, way off in the ‘fringe’ or ‘periphery’, will on average be fur-
ther apart from each other and from the rest of the field. In terms of
causal proximity, this means they are relatively isolated and inert —
for instance, two contradictory beliefs might sit unattended on the
fringe for a long time without generating any tension. Peripheral
experiences might form relatively tight clusters with each other, but
these clusters will themselves be remote from the rest of the mind.12
6. The Conscious Field as Deforming
We can get a better sense of what an account of the conscious field
must account for by considering the distinction between deforming
and non-deforming fields. In a deforming field, the relations among
elements change over time; constituents of the field can become closer
together or further apart. In a non-deforming field, the constituent
points and regions always retain their relations to each other, though
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[12] If a particular form of interaction was especially ‘easy’ between two experiences, perhaps
because it had occurred so many times before, or because of some innate feature of the
mind’s architecture, it might occur without needing any attention, and even without enter-
ing consciousness; this would mean two elements being extremely close to each other but
extremely peripheral to the attentional focus.
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things may move in the field from one point to another. Two very
prominent examples of fields, the visual field and the Euclidean spa-
tial field, are non-deforming. But consider the field of bodily sensa-
tions (proprioception, pains, itches, etc.); plausibly, these are arrayed
spatially, but as the body changes shape, over seconds or years, points
in this field change their relations to each other. And relativistic phys-
ics tells us that objective space(-time) can also deform, though this
remains challenging to imagine.
If we think of consciousness as a field of attentional or causal prox-
imity, should we think of it as deforming or non-deforming? One rea-
son to think of it as deforming is that it seems that habituation,
learning, etc. can change the relevant relations between elements. But
a more subtle reason comes from the need to make sense of the shift-
ing centre of attention.
It is an obvious fact about attention that it can ‘move’: we can shift
our attention from one experience to another, just as we can shift our
visual focus from one image to another. The attentional focus is not at
all like the geometrical centre of a circle, which is fixed in place rela-
tive to the rest of the circle.
In fact there are two ways to express this point: that attention can
move within consciousness, and that experiences can move in relation
to attention. An example of the first phrasing comes from Searle:
‘within my conscious field at any given time I can shift my attention at
will from one aspect to another’ (Searle, 2000, p. 564); an example of
the second from James: ‘some feeling connected with your own body
may have passed from a marginal to a focal place’ (James, 1899/1983,
p. 18). I will assume in what follows that this difference is merely cos-
metic: the point is simply that there is relative motion.
But while the analogy of attentional focus to visual focus is attrac-
tive, it is hard to see them as shifting in the very same way, for the
visual focus shifts only relative to external space, not relative to the
non-deforming visual field itself. Yet there is no analogue to external
space for the attentional focus to shift relative to.
To see this more clearly, let us distinguish objective fields, repre-
sented fields, and fields of representations. Consider first a paragraph
describing the structure of a gravitational field (e.g. saying where it is
strongest): this is a set of representations (sentences, words) which
represent a field, but are not themselves a field (they are relevantly
arrayed in only one dimension). If the paragraph is accurate, its repre-
sented field will correspond to an objective (gravitational) field. Com-
pare this with a wordsearch, crossword, or Scrabble game: here a set
of representations (words) are arrayed in a two-dimensional field, but
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do not represent any sort of field. There is a field of representations,
with no represented field.
Finally, consider a map. Different symbols on the map represent
different geographic features, and the spatial relations among the
symbols represent the spatial relations among the features. Here we
have both a field of representations and a represented field, and the
two are isomorphic — we might say that the field of representations
isomorphically represents a field.13
The visual field (or any other sensory field) is a field of representa-
tions isomorphically representing an objective field: different images
in the visual field stand in certain phenomenal relations (‘visually-
above’, ‘visually-to-the-left-of’), which represent their objects as
standing in certain objective spatial relations.14 But now we can see
that the visual focus, as a point in the field of representations, does not
in fact shift at all. If a point in the field is, say, ten degrees above and to
the left of the focus, it will always be ten degrees above and to the left
of the focus. This reflects the fact that the fovea cannot move relative
to the rest of the retina.
Rather, what shifts is the entire field of representations, relative to
the represented field (or vice versa). When the eyes move relative to
the head, or the head moves, a given ‘point in the visual field’ (such as
the focus) represents a succession of different points in perceived
space. When we shift our visual focus, what we are doing is shifting
one field relative to another field.
If the attentional focus were like the visual focus in this way, then
we should explain attentional shifts by positing two distinct fields,
shifting relative to each other. But it seems a tall order, and pheno-
menologically unmotivated, to identify two distinct fields covering
everything we are conscious of.
However, if we understand the conscious field as deforming, we
have an alternative way to make sense of a field having a mobile cen-
tre. If the relations between elements can ‘stretch’ and ‘contract’
(changing ‘distance’), or twist and bend (changing ‘direction’), then
we can suppose that at any given time, one element is such that all
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[13] There are cases with both sorts of field, but no isomorphism: consider a graph of the aver-
age strength of an electrical field over time. Points in the graph are representations arrayed
in a (two-dimensional) field, and what they represent is a (three-dimensional) field,
though the two fields do not show any point-to-point correspondence.
[14] This isomorphism is only partial, in so far as the visual field is two-dimensional, or
two-and-a-half-dimensional, yet represents a three-dimensional space. Thus for instance
the relation ‘visually-smaller-than’ can represent both the ‘objectively-smaller-than’ rela-
tion and also the ‘objectively-further-away-than’. I thank Ole Koksvik for pressing me on
this point.
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relations of a certain sort to that element are ‘contracted’, to be
‘shorter’ than they otherwise would be, and are also ‘twisted’, to be
more uniform in length. That element would then come to be the cen-
tre, but this centre could shift, so that another element came to ‘pull’
all other elements closer to it, while relations to the previous centre
‘relaxed’ and became ‘longer’.
So I conclude that if consciousness is a field, it is one which
changes its own shape, ‘scrunching itself up’ first around one point,
and then around another. To use familiar metaphors, when we shine a
‘spotlight’ on that experience, it is displayed on the stage of the ‘Car-
tesian theatre’ — but the actors and audience are themselves just parts
of the theatre, and the performance is the theatre contorting so as to
touch some parts of itself with others.
Conclusions
In this paper I have tried to develop an observation: for consciousness
to be a field, it should allow for elements to be at variable distances
along multiple dimensions, and existing analyses do not provide for
this. I then proposed a way to allow for this, by thinking of elements of
consciousness as arrayed according to their causal, or specifically
attentional, proximity. Neither unity, nor the attentional focus, pro-
vides the necessary structure for consciousness to be a field; this may
be unimportant, for consciousness may not be a field. Yet talking
about it as a field has been attractive to many authors, and in so far as
they wish to regard consciousness as phenomenologically structured
in a field-like way, I hope that the suggested analyses, in terms of
either attentional or causal proximity, are of interest.
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